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Abstract 
This article examines the blurred boundaries between public and private repressive practices in 
Wilhelmine Germany with a special focus on the legal and administrative framework drawn up to 
redistribute security tasks and delegate the use of violence to non-state actors. While the rapid 
escalation of political violence in Central and Eastern Europe after 1917 has been widely discussed 
in the recent historiography, the structure of violence in the pre-war period remains less explored, 
especially with regard to the public-private interplay in the policing of popular protests. After the 
first massive strike by Ruhr miners in 1889, the Prussian authorities began to support the formation 
of semi-private armed protection groups in an effort to tackle ‘strike terrorism’. The idea of 
privatizing repressive practices arose as a result of widespread fears of social and political 
disintegration. Yet, although it may seem paradoxical, the precondition for delegating the use of 
violence to non-state actors was Prussian administrators’ confidence in the state’s solidity and 
efficiency. The ambivalence in contemporary discourses concerning the vulnerability of the existing 
social and political order is crucial to explaining why the Prussian authorities implemented 
strategies for legally distributing arms to those groups that were considered part of the ‘loyal 
classes’. The mobilization against ‘strike terrorism’ involved not only officially organized armed 
groups, such as the Zechenwehren, but also more informal or extra-legal strategies such as private 
use of the municipal police, the distribution of arms to strike-breakers and the militarization of 
white-collar workers and supervisors. 
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‘The Zechenwehren auxiliary corps were fully armed with revolvers and batons before the 
beginning of the war. In the meantime, weapons had been confiscated and used for different 
purposes’.1 The management of the Gutehoffnungshütte mining company wrote this concerned note 
to the Essen Police President only a few months before Germany’s defeat in 1918 and the outbreak 
of the November Revolution. After four years of total war, both state authorities and the managers 
of major Ruhr companies were highly concerned about the risk of strikes and political upheaval. 
They therefore attempted to reorganise semi-private armed groups known as the Zechenwehren, 
which had been formally regulated in the mid-1890s. The Zechenwehren reached their peak during 
the miners’ strikes of 1905 and 1912, when more than 2,000 white-collar workers and mining 
supervisors joined anti-strike formations in 117 companies in the Ruhr area.2 Over the two decades 
prior to the First World War, the Prussian administration had demonstrated consistent interest in 
encouraging the formation of these auxiliary groups, which could legally support police repression 
and reinforced the unity of the ‘loyal classes’ against supposed revolutionary threats. 
The Zechenwehren saw action only infrequently and the show of force was seemingly more 
important than its actual use. However, the fact that these armed groups were openly supported by 
the Prussian authorities raised the question of whether they effectively protected strikebreakers and 
maintained public order or whether, in contrast, they contributed to radicalising social conflicts and 
delegitimising the Wilhelmine state. The controversial definition of violence as a legitimate course 
of action and the blurred boundaries between legal and extra-legal repression are problems that had 
already emerged during the period of relative peace and progress prior to 1914. The aim of this 
article is to analyse the changing concept of security and the legitimate use of physical force in 
times of industrial unrest, with a particular focus on the public-private interplay in policing strikes 
and popular protests. In late Imperial Germany, collaboration between public and private practices 
of repression involved not only officially organised armed groups, such as the Zechenwehren, but 
also more informal or extra-legal strategies such as the semi-privatisation of municipal police 
forces, the distribution of arms to strikebreakers and the militarisation of white-collar workers and 
supervisors. 
The supposedly defensive nature of the Zechenwehren (the term literally means ‘colliery 
defence’) and the desire for better protection of ‘willing workers’ during periods of industrial unrest 
were closely linked to the perception of strikes as social infractions that posed a threat to national 
security. In Wilhelmine society, the rapid process of nation building and industrialisation, and 
openly declared imperial ambitions increased anxieties over subversion and the ‘unpatriotic 
opposition’ of the Social Democrats. The expansionist Weltpolitik heightened international tensions, 
while the emerging narrative of encirclement showed that the Kaiserreich was a fragile entity 
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pervaded by a general sense of superiority and self-overestimation.3 Indeed, strong military and 
bureaucratic traditions coexisted with delegitimised aspects of politics, such as the restrictive 
suffrage law in Prussia and legal discrimination against the Social Democratic milieu. Even though 
there was no clear democratic deficit on the part of Germany when compared to France, the United 
Kingdom and the United States, the clash between ‘subversive forces’ and ‘parties of order’, as well 
as the Reich’s growing debts and the scandals that plagued the Kaiser, destabilised German political 
life and fostered a fear that the established order was being threatened.4 
The social approach to German history broadly developed during the 1970s, although 
surprisingly few studies have focussed on the use of repressive practices against strikes and popular 
protests in the pre-war period.5 During the early 1990s, Klaus Tenfelde noted that a systematic 
history of the social and political conflicts in the Ruhr area had not yet been written, and this 
observation remains true today.6 New studies on criminality and terrorism have shown that the 
European states made a comprehensive effort to expand and modernise their police and justice 
apparatus around 1900.7 However, the formal and informal efforts to privatise repressive practices 
remain largely unexplored and the mobilisation of thousands of Zechenwehr auxiliary policemen 
has been persistently underestimated in the literature.8 While organised violence after 1917 has been 
widely discussed by historians, the structure of violence within the German Empire has been less 
well explored, especially with regards to the interplay between public law enforcement and private 
security.9 I begin this article by examining the repressive responses to strikes and the disciplining 
strategies adopted by employers and state authorities between the early 1890s and the First World 
War. The second section then focusses on public law enforcement and the privatisation of 
repressive practices. In the third section, I will analyse the legal framework and activities of 
Zechenwehr auxiliaries. The fourth section systemises the different forms and features of the 
mobilisation of the ‘loyal classes’ in the two decades before 1914. In the concluding section, I will 
explore the continuities and changes from Wilhelmine Germany to the early post-war years. 
 
Social Discipline and the Structure of Violence in Wilhelmine Germany 
Due to the unrestricted right to buy and keep arms and the ready availability of cheap revolvers, the 
circulation and handling of weapons was widespread in Wilhelmine society.10 Potential or symbolic 
forms of violence materialised during military parades, war memorial services and 
commemorations, which perpetuated the high social value of arms and uniforms. After the 
Kaiserreich was proclaimed at Versailles following three victorious wars, construction of a German 
national identity became closely linked with militarism and the cult of honour.11 The colonial wars, 
modern conscription and mass participation in veterans’ organisations, shooting clubs and 
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associations providing military training to teenage boys (Jungdeutschland-Bund) also contributed to 
the development of a commitment to the military among the German public.12 Along with these 
forms of potential and symbolic violence, different forms of physical violence were a normal part of 
daily life, such as in the repression of crime and subversion, but also duelling, academic fencing and 
pub fights.13 Everyday violence was more widespread in East Prussia due to the nationality conflict 
between Germans and Poles and anti-Semitic sentiments.14 Eventually, the performative nature of 
organised violence emerged in the context of strikes and popular protests. Despite the low numbers 
of causalities and the largely peaceful nature of strikes, popular protests always involved verbal 
confrontations and low-level violence, due in part to state repression, in part to violent actions 
perpetrated by protesters, but more frequently to the violent incidents that broke out between 
strikers and strikebreakers.15 
Following the first major strike by the Ruhr miners in 1889 and the abolition of the anti-
socialist laws one year later, the Prussian authorities feared they would be unable to guarantee the 
maintenance of public order in the case of massive strikes.16 As noted by James Retallack, the 
common aim of the parties of order was to ‘make Germany safe again’ during an era of political 
modernisation and Social Democratic electoral triumphs.17 The perceived weakness of the state’s 
security organisations was exacerbated by the mass movements of domestic and international 
migrants from rural areas to the booming industrial regions that had taken place. In the province of 
Westphalia, for example, the population increased from 1.7 to 4.1 million between 1870 and 1910.18 
During the strike wave of 1889–1893, massive use of infantry and cavalry units had been necessary 
to maintain order and intimidate organised workers, not only in Westphalia, but also in Saarland and 
Upper Silesia. In 1889, several workers and members of their families were killed or seriously 
injured by Prussian troops and police officers in cities in the Ruhr area, such as Hörde, Gladbeck, 
Bochum, Bottrop and Brackel, near Dortmund.19 
Alongside the wave of strikes that took place around 1890, the growth of the socialist-
oriented Free Unions created an urgent sense that new repressive and disciplining strategies needed 
to be adopted. Although Germany was a functioning Rechtsstaat, the legislation governing 
associations and public order was quite restrictive and allowed the Prussian state to discretionally 
employ repressive practices. Prior to the more liberal Law of Associations being passed in 1908, the 
Prussian authorities and employers’ associations, which made extensive use of lockouts, could 
legally repress the labour movement.20 Nevertheless, membership of the Free Unions passed the 
two million mark in 1910 and the number of labour disputes remained high until 1914.21 One 
possible strategy for intensifying authoritarian control over social movements was to ask the army 
to perform police functions, although this was largely unpopular. Even though there had been 
massive military involvement in strikes around 1890, the civilian authorities hesitated to call for 
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military intervention, which was considered a measure of last resort. In 1906, for example, the 
Berlin Police Chief remarked that he was ‘more afraid of the soldiers’ rowdiness than of the Social 
Democrats’.22 Prussian military commanders were not adequately prepared to intervene in the 
policing of civilian society and they tended to avoid inter-institutional cooperation with civil 
servants.23 The security architecture of the German Empire rested on the assumption that the 
military had to support the police in cases of great labour unrest; however, the focus of the army 
was clearly on external threats.24 As a result, military involvement in the policing of industrial areas 
resulted in fewer deadly confrontations in Imperial Germany than in France and Austria-Hungary.25 
Another possible repressive response to strikes and popular protests was to reinforce the 
ordinary police forces, which was associated with high costs and practical difficulties, such as 
providing the necessary training and equipment to thousands of new police officers. For this reason, 
new concepts of security during times of industrial unrest, such as temporarily delegating the use of 
force to armed protection groups, were viewed as positive strategies for limiting security costs and 
avoiding the unpopular move of using the army to suppress strikers. The idea of privatising 
repressive practices also gained traction from the Prussian administrators’ confidence in the state’s 
solidity and in the loyalty of a large portion of the population. The perceived urgency of opposing 
social disintegration and, although it may seem paradoxical, the fact that the Wilhelmine elites were 
confident in their own strength created the precondition for delegating the use of violence to non-
state actors. The ambivalence of contemporary discourses concerning strength and weakness is 
crucial in explaining why the Prussian state tolerated or even actively drew up and implemented 
strategies for sharing security tasks with groups that were considered to belong to the ‘loyal 
classes’. 
 
Public Law Enforcement and the Privatisation of Repressive Practices in Industrial Regions 
The Prussian authorities considered strikes in mines and collieries to be even more threatening than 
those in other industrial sectors. The mining companies produced goods that were fundamental to 
the national interest, but they were often geographically isolated and therefore difficult to control. In 
addition, they had significant stocks of dynamite that could potentially be stolen by striking 
workers. For these reasons, the need for law enforcement and the formation of armed protection 
groups such as the Zechenwehren seemed particularly urgent in the mining and metallurgical sector. 
In 1889, more than 100,000 Ruhr mineworkers went on strike for almost a month, with the labour 
unrest also involving the industrial conurbations of Upper Silesia, Saxony and Saarland. 
Immediately after the strike, Ernst Ludwig Herrfurth, the Prussian Interior Minister, travelled to the 
Ruhr area and ordered that the gendarmes be armed with revolvers. He also took the initiative to 
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reinforce the Gendarmerie corps, which was originally deployed in rural areas but now had to also 
serve in industrial conurbations.26 Furthermore, the Prussian local authorities and the Gendarmerie 
started to monitor more closely the activities of the miners’ mutual-aid societies that had emerged 
from corporatist traditions and were suspected of being ‘infected’ with socialist ideas.27 The 
Prussian administration also sought the collaboration of major companies in an effort to control the 
activities of ‘foreign agitators’ and to uncover more details about the organisation of strikes.28  
Remarkably, this intensification of authoritarian control did not go hand in hand with 
increased violence and extra-legal activities on the part of the trade unions in the mining sector. The 
labour movement was largely nonviolent and openly demonstrated its loyalty by sending a 
delegation to the Kaiser during the strike of 1889. The socialist newspapers and the labour press 
continually repeated the mantras of ‘demonstrate peacefully’, ‘keep calm’ and ‘avoid confrontation 
with the police’.29 After 1889, the next case of large-scale violent confrontation during the labour 
conflicts in the Ruhr area was the so-called Polish riot in Herne, which took place some ten years 
later. The Herne strike had been initiated by Polish workers and it culminated in the ‘Battle of the 
Bahnhofstrasse’ during the last days of June 1899.30 This was one of the few cases of industrial 
unrest in which armed groups of striking workers were involved in violent confrontations with 
gendarmes, Prussian troops and the Zechenwehren. The Prussian authorities deliberately 
overreacted because they regarded the strike as a conspiracy by Polish nationalists supported by the 
Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), even though, ironically, the German trade unions 
stigmatised the riot in Herne as a ‘childish prank’ carried out by ‘alcoholics’ and ‘intellectually 
lower’ Polish workers.31 In the case of Herne, and more generally in relation to Polish labour 
organisations, social fears and the repression of popular protests overlapped with nationalist 
tensions, migration-related conflicts and ethnocentric attitudes, resulting in a disproportionately 
harsh reaction against minorities.32 
In other booming industrial regions, such as the Saar district, the situation was somewhat 
different from that in the Ruhr area because the state mining companies had not been privatised and 
the SPD had almost no influence over organised labour. During the strike of 1893 in Saarland, the 
overreaction of the Prussian Gendarmerie and the moral panic of the bourgeois elites radicalised the 
conflict. Local socialist newspapers, such as the Bote von der Saar, advertised the ‘Rechtsschutz-
Revolver’ (workers’ legal protection gun) and approximately 800 of them were sold to miners 
shortly before the outbreak of the strike.33 Despite massive intervention by the Gendarmerie, the 
miners used firearms and even dynamite to attack the strikebreakers.34 The strike was not dissimilar 
to a small guerrilla war, with armed miners taking control of certain forest paths and rural areas 
while the Prussian administration was temporarily unable to maintain order in the region. The 
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possession of firearms was also widespread among miners in the Ruhr area and the gun market was 
booming all over the country.35 Some industrial towns, such as Hamborn, were no-go areas for the 
police, while the Prussian authorities in the county of Essen recorded more than 1,300 violations of 
firearms regulations between 1898 and 1900.36 
During the first half of the 19th century, the Prussian state controlled only two relatively 
small police corps: the Land Gendarmerie Corps, which was established during the Napoleonic 
Wars, and the Royal Guards, which had been created during the revolution of 1848 in Berlin. Both 
the Gendarmerie and the Royal Guards were well organised, although they operated with less than 
3,000 officers, almost half of whom were stationed in Berlin.37 In other major Prussian towns, such 
as Dortmund, Magdeburg and Cologne, only 30 or 40 officers were available per 100,000 residents. 
In rural areas, the difference was even more dramatic, there being only eight officers per 100,000 
residents.38 However, after 1848, the situation changed and all the Prussian police corps were 
gradually enlarged. During the early 1870s, the Prussian Ministry of the Interior decided that at 
least one police officer per 1,500 residents should be employed in urban areas. This goal was 
reached in the 1880s and after the turn of the century the proportion of policemen to residents in the 
major towns was even higher, standing at approximately one to 700.39 The total number of Land 
Gendarmerie, Royal Guards and municipal police officers reached the 40,000 mark in 1913, at 
which time Prussia had a population of 40 million.40 This unprecedented expansion of the police 
forces was not just quantitative but also qualitative, since the policemen were better trained and 
armed. The total amount of money spent by the Prussian state on policing increased from 26.5 
million marks in 1891 to 86.5 million marks on the eve of the First World War.41 The most 
evocative symbol of this ground-breaking development of police forces was the gigantic new 
building constructed in Alexanderplatz to house the Berlin Police Department, which was 
completed in 1889 and where nearly 6,000 watchmen, criminal commissars and inspectors were 
based.42  
The expansion of the Prussian police was only in part directed by the central administration. 
Almost 40% of available police officers in 1900 belonged to municipal police units, which were 
dependent on the city administration and therefore susceptible to the influence of local elites. The 
centrally controlled Royal Guards were only dispatched to the major industrial towns after 1909, 
which meant that during the late 19th century the local administrations desperately needed financial 
resources to expand their municipal police forces. This resulted in industrial magnates being 
formally or informally allowed to pay for local police enforcement. Semi-privatisation of the 
municipal police was more widespread in industrial areas, where there was a particularly urgent 
need to increase the size of the security forces. In these regions, the perceived vulnerability to 
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‘strike terrorism’ was the main argument used by employers and managers to demand military 
protection for ‘willing workers’ and, if their request for more protection was rejected, to justify 
privatisation of the use of force.43 
 
Figure 1. A group of police officers and inspectors pose in front of the Oberhausen colliery along 
with two private guards and the general manager of the company. Photograph, March 1912, 130-
35014-2, Stiftung Rheinisch-Westfälisches Wirtschaftsarchiv, Cologne, Germany. 
 
Bourgeois newspapers such as the Rheinisch-Westphalische Zeitung and the Kölnische Zeitung 
were in direct contact with the managements of big companies in the Ruhr area. They provided anti-
strike propaganda and in exchange called for support from leading industrialists to increase 
newspaper circulation among white-collar workers.44 Members of the Prussian Landtag, such as 
Wilhelm Hirsch, also openly supported the Ruhr industrialists’ lobby.45 The Prussian authorities 
were, of course, aware of this orchestrated dissemination of disinformation and lobbying pressure. 
In 1905, the police of Recklinghausen reported that the employers’ professed need for more military 
protection should be considered false and irrational.46 The strike of 1905 heightened tensions 
between the Ruhr industrialists and the government in Berlin. Important members of the Bülow 
cabinet, such as Arthur von Posadowsky-Wehner, who served as Secretary of the Interior and Vice 
Chancellor, were disappointed by the ‘egoistic’ and ‘irresponsible’ autocratic management style of 
employers who refused to enter into negotiations with union representatives.47 In 1912, the year of 
the third and final major strike by the Ruhr miners during the pre-war period, several mining and 
metal companies in the Ruhr area complained again about the lack of protection for strikebreakers 
and invented episodes of violence and intimidation against them. The police department of Essen 
explicitly denied the credibility of these claims.48 When the management of the Gutehoffnungshütte 
mining company recognised that anti-strike propaganda was ineffective in persuading the state 
police and the Governor of Westphalia to intervene, the company decided to place more pressure on 
local authorities to obtain support against ‘strike terrorism’.49 
Despite the ongoing expansion of the police forces, the lack of policemen was still a real 
problem in many areas peripheral to the industrial regions. In the town of Neunkirchen, for 
example, three policemen had to control more than 18,000 residents. Neunkirchen was the 
hometown of the steel magnate Karl Ferdinand von Stumm, a prominent member of the Reichstag 
and the Pan-German League. Due to the very limited presence of police officers, Stumm had to rely 
on his foremen, white-collar workers and skilled workers to help maintain order and discipline. He 
10 
 
strongly supported the formation of shooting clubs and veterans’ associations where highly paid 
workers could gain social respectability and learn to use weapons. Although supervisors and white-
collar workers could not always join pre-existing nationalist and militarist groups, they successfully 
created their own organisations. In 1904, the Prussian authorities granted the highly paid workers at 
the ironworks in Burbach, in the Saar district, the right to establish their own association, which was 
authorised to wear uniforms and issue orders and decorations. They participated in public 
commemorations and celebrations, created a club flag and were symbolically armed with axes.50 
Consolidation of the internal hierarchy of the mining and metallurgic sector was symbolised 
by group photos, in which supervisors and mine foremen appeared as a separate entity from the 
mass of workers. They formed a distinctive group that impressed with their superior clothes and 
posture, which tended to imitate the dominant habitus of the bourgeoisie or military and aristocratic 
elites. The disciplinary tasks carried out by supervisors and highly paid employees were supported 
by leading industrialists, such as Stumm and Krupp, who considered the hierarchy and discipline of 
the Prussian army to be the best model for their factories.51 In Neunkirchen, Stumm provided his 
supervisors with revolvers and sticks to encourage them to ‘defend themselves’ against subordinate 
workers.52 He claimed to have quasi-feudal rights in his ironworks and, in his mind at least, he was 
the only person who could legitimately manage discipline and punishment.53 White-collar workers 
and supervisors were the long arm of the autocratic paternalism of German industrialists and, as 
noted by Jürgen Kocka, they assumed responsibility for authoritarian control and repression on 
behalf of the company.54 Private companies also granted special benefits to ‘loyal workers’. After 
the strike of 1912, for instance, the Westende colliery near Duisburg decided to make extraordinary 
payments of 200 marks to its managers and 50 to 150 marks to its supervisors.55 
As mentioned above, alongside the militarisation of white-collar workers and supervisors 
against potential labour insurgency, German industrialists also paid local administrations for the 
dedicated services of municipal police officers. This widespread, albeit not formally regulated, 
phenomenon positioned local police officers as a de facto semi-private police force. By the mid-
19th century, employers were seeking to corrupt state agents and offered benefits such as free flats 
to police officers who agreed to provide full-time patrol services for private companies. During the 
1870s, German industrialists attempted to cooperate more formally with local administrations with 
the aim of regulating the private use of police forces. The idea of accepting private funding to 
increase the numbers of police officers in industrial regions was also supported by the Ministry of 
the Interior.56 In 1875, Krupp paid the salaries and retirement contributions of six gendarmes who 
worked exclusively in the area surrounding the company. While Krupp’s aim of establishing a 
private police force remained an unrealised project, private use of municipal police became a 
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common practice in pre-war Germany. The presence of regular police officers in the Krupp factory 
continued throughout the First World War after the creation of a special police unit, the Polizeistelle 
Krupp, with the aim of controlling the foreign workers who were compelled to work for the 
company.57 
Other major steel producers in the Ruhr region adopted the same strategy as Krupp. The 
Thyssen plant in Hamborn, for example, paid for the services of eight police officers in 1908, and 
during the strike of 1905 the city council allowed Thyssen to arm his mine foremen with revolvers 
and sticks.58 Along with policemen being regularly paid by private companies, there were 
occasional acts of corruption, especially during labour disputes. In 1912, the management of the 
Gutehoffnungshütte mining company agreed that the company would make a payment of three 
marks and give free meals to Prussian gendarmes who came from outside the Ruhr area to support 
the local police. The Gutehoffnungshütte management also directly employed local police officers 
as security guards and paid them between three and five marks a day depending on their rank.59 
After the strike, the mine owners and managers organised a meeting near Gelsenkirchen to approve 
extraordinary payments to police officers who had served during the labour unrest. The meeting was 
attended by 14 managers who agreed that 11 companies should pay a total of 20,880 marks for the 
services of state police officers.60 The Phoenix colliery, for example, paid out a total of almost 2,000 
marks in benefits and extraordinary payments.61 A few days later, the Gelsenkirchen Police 
President received the money and sent his thanks to the local employers’ association.62 By contrast, 
the Berlin Police Executive rejected the payment with the argument that police officers could not 
receive payments from non-state actors.63 
It was not only the Berlin Police Executive that showed increasing scepticism about the 
privatisation of regular police forces, since the Prussian authorities also did. Following a tumultuous 
debate in the Landtag in 1883, the Ministry of the Interior refused to approve new requests by 
employers to ‘hire’ regular police officers. However, the partnership between public and private 
repressive practices continued on a more informal basis. Major companies like Krupp paid for the 
private use of gendarmes until 1910. It was also still possible to convince local authorities with a 
generous offer of cash and benefits to allow the semi-private use of public officers. In 1904, 30% of 
all municipal police officers in the Recklinghausen district were salaried or given benefits by 
private companies. In addition, almost 20% of gendarmes in the districts of Hamm and 
Gelsenkirchen were co-funded by employers and sometimes the local authorities took the initiative 
to demand that private companies pay for the hiring of new police officers.64 In 1909, the highest 
German court issued a kind of legal approbation of mixed private-public funding of police forces. 
The court implicitly stated that the semi-private use of police officers was tolerated and that 
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policemen, even if they always served within a private factory, should be considered officers in the 
normal execution of their duties.65 
 
The Legal Framework and the Activities of the Zechenwehren 
Following the strike of 1889, the Prussian authorities drew up and implemented a new legal and 
administrative framework for the formation of armed protection groups in the mining sector. In 
September 1894, the office of the Governor of Westphalia published official guidelines for the 
activities of auxiliary policemen, which were transmitted to the local authorities of the Ruhr area.66 
The guidelines regulated the formation and function of the Zechenwehren and stated that the mining 
companies had to pay for the salaries, armament and equipment of all auxiliary formations.67 
Despite the fact that they were privately funded, the guidelines presented the Zechenwehren as a 
top-down initiative and noted that they would only be temporarily mobilised in the case of major 
strikes with the primary aim of guarding company property. According to the ‘service instructions’ 
for the Zechenwehren, the members of armed protection groups were supposed to assist the police 
in protecting strikebreakers, although they could only operate on the company’s property.68 
The armed protection groups were composed of white-collar workers, mine foremen, 
supervisors and, in few cases, also the managers who were already employed by the company 
within which the Zechenwehren were created. In 1912, for example, the Gewerkschaft Barmen 
company informed the local authorities that 18 employees had been selected as members of the 
Zechenwehr. The director of the company was part of the armed group, along with two white-collar 
workers, ten supervisors and two mine foremen.69 At the Bergmannsglück colliery, the armed 
protection group had 25 members in 1912, among them ten supervisors and six foremen, while all 
the auxiliaries at the Holland colliery near Gelsenkirchen were mine supervisors.70 The workers 
who joined the Zechenwehren were mostly Prussian subjects between 30 and 40 years of age who 
had served in the regular army.71 The fourth paragraph of the official guidelines stated that members 
of the Zechenwehren had to be officially designated as Hilfspolizeibeamten (auxiliary policemen) by 
local authorities after swearing an oath. They had to wear uniforms similar to those of the police, 
with a black and white cockade, a hat and an armlet bearing the distinctive Prussian emblem. At the 
end of the administrative procedure, Zechenwehr members were legally granted the temporary 
status of police officers, which was important if they were to be protected by article 113 of the 





Figure 2. Members of the ‘Streikkommando’ pose in front of the Alma colliery near Gelsenkirchen 
during the strike of 1893. From left to right, Prussian gendarme Kivar, gendarme Leest, gendarme 
Glaubitz, police officer Gosse, manager Koch, mine foreman Brinkmann, gendarme Laforet, mine 
foreman Keller, office worker Henschke, gendarme Zimmermann and gendarme Neumann. 
Photograph, January 1893, BBA 070410901701, Montanhistorisches Dokumentationszentrum, 
Deutsches Bergbau-Museum, Bochum, Germany. 
 
Following publication of the official guidelines in 1894, the Prussian administration took 
further steps to regulate the Zechenwehren. Special firearms licences, general service instructions 
and detailed instructions for the use of firearms were printed and distributed to auxiliary 
policemen.72 The service instructions and firearms licences had been in circulation since 1895 and 
they also served as a form of identification for legally authorised Zechenwehr auxiliaries. In 1896, 
for example, the central state government’s representative in Dortmund ordered the printing of 500 
of these special ID cards.73 They were also in use in other districts of the Ruhr area around 1900.74 
The firearms licences were validated with a police authority seal and they gave the Zechenwehr 
auxiliaries permission to carry and use weapons during strikes and public demonstrations. Although 
German legislation imposed no formal restrictions on the right to buy and bear arms, there were 
some politically motivated limitations that did not apply to the Zechenwehren.75 
According to the preamble of the General Service Instructions of 1895, municipal councils 
had the right to appoint members of the Zechenwehren in cooperation with the managements of the 
mining companies. The instructions also stated that auxiliary policemen, who were armed with 
revolvers and bayonets, must promptly carry out the orders of their superiors, who were members of 
the local government.76 The police authorities were also directly involved and sent officers to 
protect the mining companies during strikes and to take command of the Zechenwehren.77 Strict 
observance of the law, a fearless attitude in service and absolute loyalty to the Kaiser were 
explicitly mentioned as the guiding principles of militancy in the auxiliary formations.78 In both the 
General Service Instructions and the Instructions for the Use of Firearms, the Prussian authorities 
stressed that weapons could only be used if strictly necessary, and even where the use of weapons 
was deemed necessary, the auxiliaries were to avoid causing fatal injuries.79 They had to carry their 
revolvers, which must always be loaded with six cartridges, in a leather sheath on their right side 
and they had to immediately inform the local authorities if they had used their weapons or arrested 
someone.80 
The Prussian authorities were also concerned with practical problems, such as the delivery 
of weapons and the procedure for ordering police equipment. In 1911, the Essen Police President 
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asked the Gutehoffnungshütte mining company to organise a Zechenwehr unit and a few weeks 
later he advised the company of the urgency of providing auxiliary policemen with weapons and 
official armbands. The company management was invited to buy the necessary equipment in Berlin 
from the official supplier to the Prussian army and navy.81 In the same letter, the police authorities 
suggested the use of revolvers as standard weapons, since they were considered to be less dangerous 
than other handguns. Remarkably, the Gutehoffnungshütte administration decided to buy Browning 
handguns, despite the fact that the police considered these weapons to be too dangerous for the 
Zechenwehren.82 Two years later, the Gutehoffnungshütte company was again asked to reinforce its 
armed protection group and to provide its auxiliaries with police hats, armbands, revolvers and 
sticks.83 The company agreed and informed the local administrative office that the auxiliary 
formation now had 14 new members, mainly former soldiers and mine supervisors.84 
After the turn of the century, the Prussian state started to buy several coal mines in the Ruhr 
area. In 1902, the Royal Coal Mines’ Administration was established in Recklinghausen. 
Remarkably, even the state-owned companies decided to organise Zechenwehr units. While in the 
case of private companies the legal status of anti-strike formations was characterised by a mix of 
private and state support, in the case of state-owned coal mines the situation was even more 
complicated, since the auxiliaries (who were already employed by a state-owned company) were 
supposed to work temporarily for the state as auxiliary police officers. In 1905, the local office of 
the Royal Coal Mines’ Administration in Dortmund reported the high expenses incurred for the 
purchase of revolvers, ammunition and other weapons. Ironically, the state-owned company asked 
the Prussian Ministry of Commerce to pay for the Zechenwehren’s armaments and equipment.85 The 
incident in Dortmund was not an isolated one; for example, the local offices of the Royal Coal 
Mines’ Administration in Buer and Vienenburg also advised the headquarters in Recklinghausen 
that their companies had established armed protection groups.86 
The concept and formal regulation of the Zechenwehren were already well developed in the 
1890s, although it was only during the decade leading up to the First World War that legal anti-
strike formations became a widespread phenomenon. One reason for the late institution of the 
Zechenwehren is that after the major strike of 1889 industrial peace had largely been re-established 
and had lasted until there was a new peak in labour unrest between 1903 and 1907. In 1904, the 
Deutschland colliery rejected the ‘kind suggestion’ of the District President of Schwelm to establish 
an auxiliary formation, as they considered it to be counterproductive and even a possible source of 
the radicalisation of labour conflicts.87 The strike of 1905, which involved more than 200,000 
miners, marked a fundamental turning point when initially recalcitrant companies decided to create 
their own Zechenwehren. The Gewerkschaft Barmen mining company, for example, urged the 
Prussian authorities to approve their request to organise an armed protection group and then 
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emphatically declared that there was no other option than to ‘directly assume the responsibility of 
protecting the company against major threats’.88 
The local authorities in the Ruhr area were primarily involved in drawing up the 
administrative rules for the Zechenwehren. The Westphalian nobleman Eberhard von der Recke von 
der Horst was a key player in the centre-periphery of the political spectrum. In 1895, after serving 
as President of the Regional Administration for Düsseldorf, he was appointed Prussian Minister of 
the Interior and between 1899 and 1911 he served as the Governor of Westphalia. After the strike of 
1905, von der Horst reported positively to the Kaiser on the organisation and activities of the 
Zechenwehren.89 Investigations and memoranda regarding the spread of armed protection groups 
reached the highest level of the Wilhelmine state, and the office of the Governor of Westphalia 
frequently asked local administrators to compile detailed registers of the strength, armament and 
internal organisation of the Zechenwehren. Between 1904 and 1912, the Prussian authorities 
compiled at least 11 general records concerning auxiliary police units, listing the names and 
professions of their members.90 
The general statistics from 1904 recorded 162 mines and other major metallurgic companies 
with more than 100 employers in the districts of Bochum, Dortmund, Gelsenkirchen, Hagen and 
Hamm. In 41 of the 162 companies Zechenwehren had already been organised and 35 anti-strike 
formations were armed with revolvers. A total of more than 500 auxiliary policemen were active 
and the average strength of the armed protection groups was 13 members. After the strike of 1905, 
the total number of Zechenwehr auxiliaries rapidly grew to more than 2,500, while the average 
strength of the Zechenwehren also increased. Some companies were able to organise quite large 
armed groups, such as the Germania and Mont Cenis collieries, both of which had more than 70 
auxiliary policemen, and the Shamrock and Pluto mining companies, which had respectively 115 
and 126 armed men, all equipped with revolvers.91 
In 1907, Friedrich von Moltke, the new Prussian Minister of the Interior and brother of the 
Chief of the General Staff, asked the local government of Westphalia for more detailed information 
on the Zechenwehren. The 11 questions posed by Moltke indicate that the local authorities in the 
Ruhr area were recalcitrant in terms of sharing information with the central government. Moltke 
wanted to know more, not only about the Zechenwehren’s strength and armament, but also about 
their official field of activity, functions and legal status.92 He received a detailed report in early 
1908, although the formal regulation of armed protection groups had actually been in place since 
the mid-1890s when the official guidelines, firearms licences and general service instructions 
appeared. Moltke was probably badly informed by his predecessor or his colleagues in Berlin; 
however, it does seem that the regional and local authorities tended to hold a monopoly of 
information and decision making over the Zechenwehren. This may be why these auxiliary units 
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remained confined to the Ruhr area, despite attempts to extend their use to Upper Silesia.93  
Another possible reason why the Zechenwehren remained limited to the Ruhr area is that in 
other industrial hotspots, such as the Saar district, strike activity was less intense and the labour 
movement was weaker. In Saxony, the most industrialised federal state of Imperial Germany, the 
Free Unions and the SPD were even more widespread than in the Ruhr area, but the political and 
constitutional situation, the bureaucracy and Landtag differed from those in Prussia. The authorities 
in Dresden did not implement the legal and administrative framework for the Zechenwehren, 
although auxiliary formations known as Wohlfahrtsbeamten were used to help Saxon gendarmes 
during the suffrage reform demonstrations of 1905.94 Along with the Saxon Wohlfahrtsbeamten, 
special constables in the United Kingdom were another formation of volunteer officers somewhat 
similar to the Zechenwehren. Special constables were also private citizens who were often recruited 
among clerks and foremen chosen by their employers to oppose striking workers. They were legally 
transformed into constables by local judges and worked alongside regular officers.95 
 
Mobilisation of the ‘Loyal Classes’ and the Search for National Cohesion 
In an effort to keep the Zechenwehren under control, the local police authorities regularly visited the 
mining companies where auxiliary formations had been organised in order to verify information 
regarding their members.96 As a result of multiple attempts to control the numbers of Zechenwehren 
and their operations, the local authorities compiled detailed registers of auxiliary police units and 
investigated whether their members were ‘patriotic’ and ‘loyal’ citizens.97 The Gewerkschaft 
Barmen company, for example, proudly reported to the District President of Schwelm that the 
members of its Zechenwehr were ‘extremely reliable workers, who clearly support the national 
community and would never join a revolutionary movement’.98 
The Prussian administration was concerned not only about the political backgrounds of the 
auxiliary policemen, but also about the efforts of private companies to rigorously implement the 
official guidelines and instructions for the Zechenwehren. A report written by the District President 
of Münster to the Governor of Westphalia in 1904 analysed the situation in two collieries that had 
different approaches to the official guidelines. In the case of the General Blumenthal colliery in 
Recklinghausen, the instructions had been strictly followed: the 30 members of its auxiliary 
formation had been officially approved and the necessary police-style equipment was available for 
use. By contrast, the management of the Harpener Bergbau company refused to formally organise a 
Zechenwehr and claimed they improvised mobilisation of armed groups of white-collar workers and 
supervisors during strikes. This unorganised extra-legal approach was, of course, heavily criticised 
by the Prussian authorities.99 
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During the period between 1905 and 1907, the regional and local administrators in the Ruhr 
area systematically evaluated the activities of the Zechenwehren to gain a better understanding of 
whether they could provide reliable support for the regular police forces. Immediately after the 
strike of 1905, Felix von Merveldt, the District President of Recklinghausen, reported 
enthusiastically on the Zechenwehren. According to von Merveldt, the mobilisation of fully armed 
and equipped auxiliary units had proved to be very efficient. He described the Zechenwehren as a 
‘great support’ for the police, even though, ironically, there had been no occasion to really test the 
auxiliary units because the strike was largely peaceful.100 Von Merveldt also reported that the 
auxiliary policemen never operated independently and were always under the control of the regular 
police. The local authorities in Arnsberg and Münster also thought that armed protection groups 
offered good support for public law enforcement. They stressed the importance of recruiting ‘loyal 
citizens’ and of restricting the operations of auxiliary formations to the protection of the 
company.101 In his memorandum to the Governor of Westphalia, the District President of Arnsberg 
expressed his general satisfaction with the activities and patriotic attitude of the Zechenwehren. He 
emphatically suggested reactivating armed protection groups in the event of major disorders.102 
Although other high functionaries, such as the District President of Düsseldorf, cautiously criticised 
the auxiliary formations, the final report on the strike of 1905 sent to the Prussian Minister of the 
Interior described the Zechenwehren positively as ‘groups of responsible workers who actively 
supported regular police forces’.103 
The mobilisation of armed protection groups was part of a broader picture that involved the 
intensification of nationalist and anti-socialist militancy in late Imperial Germany. In addition to the 
spread of yellow unions and professional strikebreaking, a plurality of non-state actors, such as 
veterans’ and ex-soldiers’ organisations, the Imperial League Against Social-Democracy, the 
Federation of Yellow Workers and the League of Patriotic Workers (the last two having been 
established in 1907), joined the ‘parties of order’.104 Some of these groups of veterans and 
nationalist workers were directly involved in episodes of violent repression. In Blumberg, near 
Potsdam, members of the local veterans’ club brutally attacked Social Democratic agitators in 1890 
and a year later a meeting of socialist workers in the town of Eisleben was attacked by the local 
nationalist miners’ union.105 Although mobilisation of the ‘loyal classes’ did involve violent 
repression, its symbolic dimension was even more important because it emphasised the unity of the 
national community against the potential threats posed by internal and external enemies. Non-state 
actors played a key role in orchestrating the cohesion of Wilhelmine society in response to fears of 
political and social disintegration. The drive for national cohesion, despite its ambiguities and 
partial ineffectiveness, reflected the idea of ‘rallying together’ anti-socialist forces, which was 
crucial in the political culture of Imperial Germany.106 
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The formation of legal armed groups to oppose the labour movement was part of the wider 
mobilisation of the ‘loyal classes’, although it must be underlined once again that, compared with 
nationalist pressure groups or armed groups of strikebreakers, the Zechenwehren were legally armed 
and permitted to use force. The Social Democratic newspapers sarcastically nicknamed the 
Zechenwehren ‘the German Pinkertons’, although this comparison is misleading because in 
Germany it was mainly the state – actively supported by certain leading industrialists – that took the 
initiative to formally redistribute coercive tasks and delegate the use of force to non-state actors.107 
The Zechenwehren embodied the idea of mobilising civil society to protect the national community 
and, like other anti-socialist organisations that emerged during the same period, the show of force 
played a much more substantial role than its actual use. 
The fact that the Zechenwehr units were directly involved in remarkably few episodes of 
armed repression was also closely related to their legal and strictly state-controlled status. The 
Social Democratic newspapers and the labour press reported quite infrequently on the activities of 
the Zechenwehren as they were more interested in episodes of intimidation and violence involving 
armed strikebreakers. Nevertheless, there were some notable episodes in which Social Democratic 
politicians explicitly criticised the Zechenwehren. During the strike of 1905, for example, the 
socialist member of the Reichstag, Theodor Bömelburg, denounced the brutality of auxiliary 
policemen. According to Bömelburg, despite armed protection groups being ordered to limit their 
use of force, they violently intimidated workers and forced them to return to work. He further 
claimed that members of the Zechenwehr in the municipal area of Herne brutally beat a striker with 
their revolvers until he collapsed.108 Bömelburg and Otto Hue, another Social Democratic member 
of the Reichstag, criticised the fact that police authorities tolerated the distribution of arms to 
strikebreakers and that the Prussian state supported not only the activities of the officially organised 
Zechenwehren, but also their extra-legal repressive practices against the labour movement. Hue 
reported that in the Lothringen colliery near Bochum more than 300 rifles were ready to be used 
against striking mineworkers.109 In the Kaiserstuhl colliery near Dortmund 65 steel-reinforced sticks 
had been distributed, not only to members of the Zechenwehr, but also to strikebreakers. Bömelburg 
created a huge sensation when he showed one of the Totschläger sticks to the Reichstag assembly 
during his speech.110 
The Zechenwehren helped to increase the disproportionate strength of the Wilhelmine state 
in relation to the labour movement and they also demonstrated national cohesion against 
perceptions that the established order was being threatened. During the Herne riot in 1899, more 
than 2,100 Prussian soldiers, along with hundreds of regular officers, were mobilised against less 
than 1,800 striking workers.111 In addition to this disproportionate show of strength, the local 
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administration urged the mine companies to mobilise the Zechenwehren. These armed groups 
represented the authorities’ response to the perceived lack of protection in industrial areas, where 
‘strike terrorism’ appeared to be a threat to both private interests and national security. However, the 
activities of the auxiliary formations were intentionally limited. The Prussian authorities were more 
interested in the show of force, which created a climate of intimidation and emphasised the unity of 
the ‘loyal classes’ against revolutionary threats. After 1905, the spread and formal regulation of the 
Zechenwehren did not notably change until 1914. However, they did partially lose importance due 
to growing efforts to expand the regular police forces and the rise of powerful employers’ 
associations that implemented effective strategies against the labour movement, such as the 
formation of yellow unions and the use of blacklists and lockouts. 
 
Conclusion 
During the period between the major miners’ strikes of 1889 and 1912, the Prussian authorities 
formally supported, or at least tolerated, a plurality of repressive practices against the labour 
movement. The intensification of authoritarian control and the partial privatisation of security tasks 
had three main aspects. The first was the militarisation of white-collar workers and supervisors in 
order to discipline subordinated workers. With the aim of mobilising ‘loyal workers’, private 
companies granted material benefits, such as higher salaries and extraordinary payments, but also 
immaterial benefits, such as the right to use weapons and entrance to the bourgeois social circles of 
Wilhelmine society. The second was another more formal type of state-supported repression that 
was founded on the unprecedented growth of police forces in industrial areas. However, while the 
Gendarmerie Corps and the Royal Prussian Police were more strictly controlled from above, the 
municipal police force underwent forms of semi-privatisation, since its officers had been paid by, or 
were materially dependent on, private companies. The third and final type of repressive practice 
was related to the spread of officially organised armed protection groups in the Ruhr area. The 
blurred boundaries between private interests and national security in the context of labour conflicts 
are clearly recognisable in the creation of Zechenwehren not only in private companies, but also in 
the state-owned collieries of the Royal Coal Mines’ Administration. 
Recognition of the plurality of the mixed public-private repressive practices examined in 
this article provides a better understanding of the patterns of continuity and change between 
Wilhelmine and Weimar Germany. Despite the fact that in both the pre-war and post-war periods 
the Prussian authorities had emphasised the auxiliary role of the ‘defence organisations’, the 
Zechenwehren remained regionally and numerically limited compared with the paramilitary militias 
20 
 
and vigilante formations that proliferated after the November Revolution. In the province of 
Brandenburg, the citizens’ militias (Einwohnerwehren, originally called Bürgerwehren) increased 
from 108 formations with 8,153 members in early 1919 to almost 2,000 units with more than 
66,000 members just one year later, whereas the Zechenwehren never mobilised more than 3,000 
members.112 The Einwohnerwehren also spread to other German states, such as Bavaria, where they 
had been established by war veterans and were able to mobilise 200,000 members within a few 
months.113 Before they were abolished in 1920, almost one million citizens armed with 690,000 
rifles and bayonets had joined civic guards in the entire German Reich.114 
While the Zechenwehren only operated in the Ruhr valley, post-war armed associations such 
as the citizens’ militias were a translocal and transnational phenomenon with centralised 
administration: the Zentralstelle für Einwohnerwehren and, in the case of the Bavarian militias, the 
Organisation Escherich. Structured into several departments (propaganda, armament, etc.), the 
Zentralstelle organised lobbying activities in Berlin and published a propaganda organ. The 
growing constellation of post-war Wehren was not restricted to the field of industrial unrest, but had 
rather a plurality of motivations and purposes, such as the fear of Bolshevism, the repression of 
criminality and disorder, and the promotion of national cohesion. In this latter aspect they were, at 
least to a certain extent, comparable to the Zechenwehren, although they were not directly involved 
in political conflicts and ideological antagonism in the same way that the post-war paramilitary 
units and citizens’ militias were. 
The guidelines for the Zechenwehren issued in 1894 stressed the auxiliary role of legal 
armed groups, which remained formally under the control of state police authorities. During the 
post-war period, the citizens’ militias were also formally defined as an auxiliary corps, although 
they were a de facto paramilitary organisation with greater similarities to the Freikorps than to the 
Zechenwehren. Nevertheless, the guidelines governing the Zechenwehren and the Einwohnerwehren 
had some things in common, such as the definition of members as auxiliary policemen and the 
possibility to place suspects under temporary arrest.115 In Wilhelmine Germany, legal armed groups 
were officially approved and controlled by local authorities and the initiative to form auxiliary units 
to oppose striking workers came from above. After 1918, by contrast, the spread of ‘defence 
organisations’ was more spontaneous, although the Weimar state also aimed to control recruitment 
and to politically instrumentalise the Einwohnerwehren. During the first years of the Weimar 
period, armed associations were led by charismatic figures and linked to military authorities and 
right-wing paramilitary units, which would have been unthinkable in the case of the pre-war armed 
groups. 
The Technische Nothilfe (Technical Emergency Corps), which was created in early 1919 
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after the so-called Spartacist uprising in Berlin, was also substantially different from the 
Zechenwehren, although both organisations were controlled by civilian authorities and aimed at 
tackling ‘strike terrorism’ in industrial sectors of national importance. The Technische Nothilfe was 
originally established as a paramilitary formation by the Garde-Kavallerie-Schützen-Division.116 
Aimed at temporarily replacing striking workers, it had close connections with right-wing 
paramilitaries as well as the regular army. The Zechenwehren, by contrast, had no association with 
the old Imperial Army and nor were they supposed to replace strikers. However, both the 
Zechenwehren and the Technische Nothilfe were state-supported and formally regulated groups that 
could be mobilised in the case of major labour disputes. The Technische Nothilfe, which already had 
more than 150,000 volunteer members in 1921, was headed by former Army Pioneers officer Otto 
Lummitzsch and supported by the Minister of Defence, Gustav Noske, a Majority Social 
Democrat.117 Initially under the supervision of the Ministry of Defence, the corps was placed under 
the control of the Ministry of the Interior after the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, which limited 
the size of the German army. This governmental strikebreaking organisation also became an 
emergency response unit that provided help after fires, storms and other natural disasters. The 
civilian volunteers of the Technische Nothilfe had no connection with private companies, unlike the 
Zechenwehren, whose members were already employed by the companies in which they served 
with the temporary status of auxiliary police officers. Remarkably, the ‘weak’ Weimar state was 
able to at least partly finance the Technical Emergency Corps, whereas the weapons, equipment, 
uniforms and salaries of the Zechenwehren were paid for by private companies.118 
Without a doubt, the mobilisation of anti-strike and anti-communist organisations in the 
post-war period was much more politically and ideologically charged and more violent than before 
1914.119 Although it would be misleading to overemphasise the similarity of the repressive practices 
seen during the pre- and post-war years, some aspects of continuity can be discerned. The notion of 
defence (Wehr) and the official guidelines and motivation for the auxiliary formations in 
Wilhelmine Germany partly overlapped with those of the legal armed groups that emerged after 
1918, such as the Einwohnerwehren and the Technische Nothilfe. The pre- and post-war Wehren 
shared certain characteristics, such as the recruitment of auxiliary forces from among the ‘loyal 
classes’ in order to satisfy demands for more protection and, in theory at least, to enforce the social 
and political order against broadly perceived threats. 
The formal and informal collaborations between public and private repressive practices were 
intended to temporarily fill a power vacuum. In pre-1914 Germany, the vulnerability of the 
established order was linked to unprecedented intensification of labour conflicts and the 
extraordinary growth of both the SPD and the Free Unions. Although private companies were given 
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broad autonomy in terms of recruiting and organising armed protection groups, the Zechenwehren 
were directly supervised, coordinated and bureaucratically controlled by the Prussian authorities. 
The Wilhelmine state was better able to effectively control and regulate the formation of auxiliary 
units than the early Weimar Republic. The rise of armed groups and the redistribution of security 
tasks against revolutionary threats had already intensified around 1900 and the motivations were 
similar, although the results were different, after 1918, when the collapse of the state’s authority 
gave rise to a previously unknown level of social protest, ideological antagonism and violent 
repression. 
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